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VICARIOUS ADMISSIONS AND THE UNIFORM RULES
JUDSON F. FALKNOR*

The admissibility of extra-judicial utterances as "vicarious admis-

sions" under the Uniform Rules of Evidence would be regulated by

Rule 63 (8) (a) and Rule 63 (9), quoted in the margin.1 Adoption of
these rules would work substantial changes in existing doctrine;
changes which the informed consensus may ultimately deem desirable,
but which, nonetheless, appear to deserve somewhat more penetrating
discussion than has so far been engendered. I hasten to make it clear
that I do not necessarily oppose the proposals; merely that I have
some doubts which have not as yet been resolved.
One further preliminary word: the proposals of the Uniform Rules
follow almost exactly the proposals of the Model Code of Evidence,
and the draftsmen of the Uniform Rules, for explanation of the
grounds of the proposals, in effect refer us to the Comment appended
to the Model Code provisions. Accordingly, to that Comment we
shall necessarily turn.
AGENTS' DECLARATIONS

As Professor Morgan has said, the rule stated in Uniform Rule
63 (8) (a) "represents the orthodox doctrine,"2 that is to say, there
must be a preliminary showing of "speaking" authority;3 "authority
to do an act or to conduct a transaction does not of itself include
authority to make statements concerning the act or transaction .... ,,4
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; formerly Dean

and Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law and Professor

of Law, University of California School of Law, Berkeley; member of bar
of State of Washington.

1. [There shall be exceptionally admissible:]
Rule 63(8) (a): Authorized. . . Admissions. As against a party, a statement
... by a person authorized by the party to make a statement or statements
for him concerning the subject of the statement ....
Rule 63(9): Vicarious Admissions. As against a party, a statement which
would be admissible if made by the declarant at the hearing if (a) the statement concerned a matter within the scope of an agency or employment of
the declarant for the party and was made before the termination of such
relationship, or (b) the party and the declarant were participating in a plan
to commit a crime or a civil wrong and the statement was relevant to the
plan or its subject matter and was made while the plan was in existence and
before its complete execution or other termination, or (c)one of the issues
between the party and the proponent of the evidence of the statement is a
legal liability of the declarant, and the statement tends to establish that
liability.
2. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508, comment (1942).
3. See Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REy. 43,
71 (1954).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 288 (1958).
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In his classic "Rationale of Vicarious Admissions,"5 Professor Morgan
observed that while "it would be captious to refuse to apply to narrative utterances the ordinary principles of representation of the law
of agency," 6 nevertheless, "it is important to distinguish between
authority to do an act and authority to talk about it. The mere fact
that B has empowered A to do act X for him adds no whit of trustworthiness to A's narratives about X; nor does it furnish any grounds
for depriving B of the usual protection against unexamined testi7
mony."
This still has a very considerable ring of persuasiveness. While it
is true, as Thomas Paine said, that "a long habit of not thinking a
thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and
raises a formidable outcry in defense of custom," 8 nonetheless, the
proponents of the repudiation of doctrine which, on its face, is rational
and conforms to pretty elementary canons of agency, ought, it would
seem, to carry the burden of justifying the change.
Which brings us to Rule 63(9) (a): "[There shall be admissible]
against a party, a statement which would be admissible if made by
the declarant at the hearing if ... the statement concerned a matter
within the scope of an agency or employment of the declarant for the
party and was made before the termination of such relationship .... "
What is intended is, of course, very clear; authority to "speak" for
the party will become quite irrelevant to admissibility. Or, put
otherwise, the authority to do an act conclusively implies the authority to speak, narratively, about that act, if the utterance is made
before the termination of the agency.
This would mean that the declaration of the defendant's chauffeur
or truck driver relating to the circumstances of the accident being
litigated, although made a year or more after the accident, would be
receivable for substantive use against defendant, provided only that
the driver was still in defendant's employ when the declaration was
made.9 I wonder. Ought I not have the right to employ an experienced and skillful truck driver, who may at the same time be a
careless, unreliable and erratic talker, without being subject to
having used against me his casual utterances made long after an
accident? If I authorize him to drive my truck it, of course, follows
that I must be responsible for what he does in the course of such
employment; but dbes it follow that necessarily I ought to be responsible for what he may say?
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

42 HARV. L. REV. 461 (1929).
Id. at 463.
Id. at 464.
PAINE, Introductionto COMMON SENSE.
See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rule 508, comment ("Illustration" 3) (1942).
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The Model Code comment offers only this in justification of the
change: "[The clause] goes beyond the common law because the
agent or servant in speaking about the transaction which it was
within his authority to perform is likely to be telling the truth in
most instances-much more likely than when later summoned to give
testimony against his principal or master."'1 But this, if sound, may
prove too much; by ignoring the question of authority to speak, and
finding trustworthiness in the mere circumstance that the declarant
is speaking of authorized conduct, we come pretty close, it seems to
me, to accepting a principle which, if generally applied, would all but
annihilate the hearsay rule. If an agent "is likely to be telling the
truth" about a past authorized act, cannot it be said with equal correctness that any declarant, one in no relationship with the party, is
"likely to be telling the truth" about his past act, if it was an act he
had a right to perform and was important to him in his own affairs?"
Not only that, the reasoning submitted for the change, carried to its
logical conclusion, would seem to come close to justifying the admission of any hearsay declaration based on personal knowledge.
Perhaps my skepticism ought to be treated merely as an "outcry
in defense of custom." Perhaps my difficulty simply arises from the
fact that the older rationale has become pretty well ingrained in my
thinking. Even so, I raise the question: Is it possible, rationally, to
harmonize a rule admitting hearsay simply because it appears that
the declarant "is likely to be telling the truth" (disregarding the
matter of representation), with the hearsay rule itself? Certainly it
is true that the traditional rule regulating the admissibility of representative admissions finds its justification in the fact of representation
rather than in any assumption that the declaration of an agent has
any more inherent dependability than other hearsay.'2
As to the suggestion in the comment that the agent-declarant is
10. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508, comment (1942).
11. In a recent Second Circuit decision, Scholle v. Cuban-Venezuelan Oil
Voting Trust, 285 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1960), Chief Judge Lumbard appears to
sanction the applicability of a "likely to be true" test on an ad hoc basis. He
said: "Moreover, even though the hearsay rule normally excludes out-of-court
statements used to establish the truth of what was said, it should not have
been applied in this case to exclude this evidence used in this way because
the need for cross-examination and jury observation of the out-of-court
speakers was minimized by the strong probability that the words if spoken
were true." Id. at 321. Taken at face value, this is fairly seismic.
12. In its report to the legislature, the New Jersey Legislative (Bigelow)
Commission recommended the deletion of paragraph (a) of Rule 63(9),
which would thus preserve existing doctrine requiring "speaking" authority.
REPORT OF THE COMIMSSION TO STUDY THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW OF Evi-

DENcE, at 58 (1956).

The Utah Committee, appointed pursuant to UTAH CODE

ANN. § 78-2-4 (1953), to consider the advisability of adopting rules of evidence in that state, in its report to the Supreme Court of Utah, dated March
2, 1959, recommended that admissibility under Uniform Rule 63(9) (a) be
limited to utterances of unavailable declarants.
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"much more likely [to be telling the truth] than when later summoned to give testimony" against the principal, it may be observed
that the declaration, if qualified under the rule, will be receivable
(against the former principal) even though the agent-principal relationship has been terminated before the trial.
There is some recent judicial authority in support of the principle
of Rule 63 (9) (a), although, if I may say so, it is not particularly
persuasive. In 1954, Judge Morris of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia' 3 declined to follow Vicksburg &
Meridian R.R. v. O'Brien14 (holding inadmissible against the railroad
the engineer's post-accident statement) because, he said, "very real
and drastic changes have occurred since that decision which compel
a different holding now." In holding admissible evidence of the statement of defendant's driver to an investigating police officer, Judge
Morris said: "To say.., that the owner of a motor truck may constitute a person his agent for the purpose of the operation of such truck
over public streets and highways, and to say at the same time that
such operator is no longer the agent of such owner when an accident
occurs, for the purposes of truthfully relating the facts concerning
the occurrence to an investigating police officer .

.

. seems to me to

erect an untenable fiction, neither contemplated by the parties nor
sanctioned by public policy." How this reasoning justifies stigmatizing the O'Brien decision as an anachronism, is far from clear. And
insofar as the holding dispenses with a showing of "speaking" authority, we are given no adequate explanation. The circumstance that the
driver is required, by law, to report the circumstances of an accident
to a public officer appears to be completely unrelated to the matter
of his authority to speak for his employer. The driver's obligation
to report arises from his status as the operator of the truck, as one
who is in a position to furnish data as to the circumstances of the
accident, not because he is expected to speak for anyone else.
Then, in 1958, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,15 citing
Judge Morris' opinion (which "appeals to us as being sound"), but
no other case, held admissible against the owner evidence of statements of its driver (made "in the hospital several hours after the
accident") to three persons (only one of whom was an investigating
officer) as to the circumstances of the accident. Beyond the reference
to the Martin case, the opinion throws no light at all on the basis for
admissibility.
The foregoing may be "turning a cannon on the garden gate"
13. Martin v. Savage Truck Line, Inc., 121 V. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1954).
14. 119 U.S. 99 (1886).
15. Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1958).
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in view of the obvious circumstance that the elimination of Rule
63 (9) (a), thereby limiting admissibility to declarations of "speaking"
agents under the conditions prescribed in Rule 63 (8) (a), would, as a
practical matter, not operate to exclude much proof not admissible
under other rules. Rule 63 (9) (c),16 as a matter of fact, is more liberal
than 63 (9) (a) in that, in the sort of situation we have been discussing,
the driver's post-accident utterance would be receivable against his
employer even though made after the termination of his employment.
Moreover, the agent's declaration may (frequently will) qualify as
an "excited utterance' under Rule 63 (4) (b) .17 Also, the exception for
declarations against interest (Rule 63(10)) would be expanded to
the point of, first, making unavailability unnecessary for admission,
and, second, clearing up any question under existing doctrine respecting the qualification, as a declaration against interest, of a statement
of a fact subjecting the declarant to civil liability. 18 The typical postaccident statement of defendant's driver, if relevant, will ordinarily
so qualify.
But while, thus, Rule 63 (9) (a) may not possess a great deal of
practical significance, nevertheless if it is questionable in principle, if
it detracts from the symmetry which is to be desired, there may be
something to be said in favor of forgetting it.

PRsoNAL KNOWLEDGE
It is to be noted that Rule 63 (8) (a) imposes no requirement of
personal knowledge. In other words, the declaration of a "speaking"
agent, is admissible against the principal, like the personal utterance
of the principal, even though the declarant has no personal knowledge
of the event or condition to which the declaration relates. On the
16. This provision, it will be recalled, provides for admissibility where one
of the issues being litigated is a "legal liability of the declarant and the
statement tends to establish that liability." See note 1 supra. This principle
was applied, as an additional ground of admissibility, in Grayson v. Williams,
supra note 15. See also MODEL

tion" 3) (1942).

CODE OF EVIDENCE

rule 508, comment ("Illustra-

17. Making admissible a statement '"made while the declarant was under
the stress of a nervous excitement caused by" his perception of the event or
condition described by the statement.

18. Rule 63(10) would make admissible a "statement which the judge finds

so far subjected [the declarant] to civil . . .liability or so far rendered
invalid a claim by him against another . . . that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be
true.... ." As to the present conflict on the point, compare Pennsylvania R.R.
v. Rochinski, 158 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Windorski v. Doyle, 219 Minn. 402,
18 N.W.2d 142 (1945); Halvorsen v. Moon & Kerr Lumber Co., 87 Minn. 18, 91
N.W. 28 (1902); and Kwiatowski v. John Lowry, Inc., 276 N.Y. 126, 11 N.E.2d
563 (1937) with Singer v. Metz Co., 101 Wash. 67, 171 Pac. 1032 (1918); Smith
v. Blakey, L.R. 2 Q.B. 326 (1867); and Tucker v. Oldbury Urban Dist. Council,
...

[1912] 2 K.B. 317. See also Estate of Baird, 193 Cal. 225, 223 Pac. 974 (1924).
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other hand, under Rule 63 (9) the requirement of personal knowledge
is imposed with respect to the declaration of an agent as to authorized
conduct, the declaration of a co-conspirator, or the declaration of one
for whose conduct the party is vicariously liable. There may be
question as to the propriety of this differentiation.
The rule is well-established, of course, that the personal utterance
of a party is admissible against him, whether or not he had personal
knowledge,19 although the doctrine is difficult to justify. It certainly
seems anomalous that where the question is whether the defendant's
dog jumped on a woman, defendant's out-of-court statement that such
had occurred (although concededly the defendant was not present at
the time) may be shown (for substantive use) when it is perfectly
clear that the defendant would not be permitted to testify that the
dog did not jump on the woman2 0
The only rational justification for dispensing with a showing of
personal knowledge with respect to a personal admission lies, as
McCormick says, in the circumstance that "admissions which become
relevant in litigation usually concern some matter of substantial
importance to the declarant upon which he would probably have
informed himself so that they possess, even when not based on firsthand observation, greater reliability than the general run of hearsay."21 But in a recent New York case,2 2 the court concluded this
reasoning was inapplicable to the declaration of an "employee." Said
the court: "The theory upon which this class of evidence is held to
be competent is that it is highly improbable that a party will admit
or state anything against himself or his own interest unless it is
true. . . . This reasoning is obviously inapplicable where, as here,
the so-called admission is not made by a party but merely by its
employee who has no interest in the outcome of the litigation and
thus has no incentive to carefully check the correctness of the statements he makes." This touches directly the correctness of Rule
63 (8) (a).
INTRA-COMPANY REPORTS

It would be a misconception to assume that the declaration of any
"speaking" agent is receivable against the principal. This is true only
if the agent is authorized to speak for the principal to a third party or
to someone outside the organization. "The doctrine of respondeatsuperior does not apply inter sese between principal and agent or between
master and servant. It is only where the principal or master brings
§ 240 (1954).
20. Janus v. Akstin, 91 N.H. 373, 20 A.2d 552 (1941).
21. MCCORmICK, EVIDENCE § 240 (1954).
22. Cox v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 693, 148 N.E.2d 879 (1958).
19. MCCORMCK, EVIDENCE
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himself in contact with the outside world through his agent or servant
that he becomes responsible for the latter's acts."2 The distinction,
while frequently overlooked, is sound in principle and well-considered recent cases support the proposition that intra-organizational
reports, unless vouched for by responsible superior authority, are
inadmissible against the organization.24
The Uniform Rules (Rule 63 (8) (a)) do not deal with the point with
desirable specificity. The rule does limit admissibility to a statement
of one "authorized by the party to make a statement or statements
for him concerning the subject of the statement . . ." and the single
word "for" may do the trick. But it would be better to be more
explicit.
DECLARATIONS OF A CO-CONSPIRATOR
As the draftsmen of the Model Code say, "the rule as generally
stated... holds the declaration inadmissible unless made in furtherance of the conspiracy." 25 But Uniform Rule 63 (9) (b) would dispense
with the "in furtherance" requirement; it will be sufficient if the
declaration "was relevant" to the conspiracy, whether or not the
inaking of the declaration tended to further the objects of the conspiracy. I have the same difficulty here as in respect of the declaration of an agent (without authority to speak) concerning authorized
conduct.
The validity of the traditional rule depends upon the circumstance
that "each conspirator is the agent of all others,"26 so that an utterance, if the making of it tends to advance the conspiracy, is properly
deemed within the scope of the agency. But the mere fact that the
co-conspirator's declaration is "relevant" to the conspiracy, or is
descriptive of its objects, or narrative of what has already been done,
is plainly insufficient, in principle, to bring the making of the utterance within the scope of the agency. As Professor Morgan has put it:
"One may make a statement concerning the conspiracy while it is
still in the course of being planned or executed, which in no way
furthers it and which, in fact, is a most effective way of blocking it.
23. Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARv. L. REV. 461,
And see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 287 (1958); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 78 (1954).
24. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 89 F. Supp. 349
(D. Mass. 1950); Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958). The holding in In re Devala Provident Gold Mining Co., 22 Ch. D. 953 (1883) represents an interesting application of the rule
463 (1929).

of non-admissibility of "intra-company" reports. There the court held inadmissible, as against a company, evidence of statements made by the chairman
of the company in a speech at a meeting of the shareholders.
25. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508, comment (1942).
26. Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 H1ARV. L. REv. 461,

464 (1929).
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Such a statement, admissible against the speaker, is, on theory, inad''27
missible against his fellow conspirators.
The justification for the Uniform Rule which would make admissible
against all conspirators the declaration of one of them concerning the
conspiracy, if made during its pendency, is, according to the Model
Code comment, that "these statements are likely to be true, and are
usually made with a realization that they are against the declarant's
interest."28
As to the proposition that "they are likely to be true," I can only
say again that I have difficulty in ascribing to this sort of declaration
more trustworthiness than to any hearsay statement based on personal knowledge.
To the suggestion that such a declaration is usually against the
declarant's interest ("penal" interest, I assume is meant), one must
agree.
Now, the fact is that under Rule 63 (10), the exception for declarations against interest would be expanded to include declarations
against penal interest; at the same time, as previously noted, the rule
would dispense with any requirement of unavailability. So that the
declaration of a co-conspirator, if asserting a fact which would subject
him to criminal liability, would in virtue of that circumstance alone,
be receivable against all the conspirators.2
Accordingly, might it not be better, in Rule 63 (9) (b), to reinstate
the traditional "in furtherance" requirement, limiting admissibility
of a "non-furthering" declaration to one which can qualify as a
declaration against interest? I should think that the net result would
have better theoretical support, and at the same time would probably
not operate to keep out much evidence which would be admissible
in virtue of the present Rule 63 (9) (b). °
VicARious ADMISSIONS BASED ON PRIVITY

Whereas, by the common law rule, a declaration of a former owner
of realty, personalty or a cause of action, touching the nature or
27. Morgan, Admissions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 181, 194 (1937).
28. MODEL CODE or EVIDENCE rule 508, comment (1942).

29. Rule 63(10) would make admissible "a statement which the judge
finds ... so far subjected [the declarant] to .. .criminal liability . . .that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless
he believed it to be true. ..."
30. The New Jersey Legislature (Bigelow) Commission recommended that
the "in furtherance" requirement be reinstated in Rule 63 (9) (b). REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE IMPROVEMENT Or THE LAW or EVIDENCE at 58
(1956). However, the Commission also recommended the reinstatement (in
Rule 63(10)) of the traditional requirement of unavailability for admissibility
of a declaration against interest. Id. at 59.
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quality of his interest, is receivable against his successor, 31 the Uniform Rules (in a rather unique proposal to tighten, rather than to
relax, existing doctrine) would reject, as a ground of admissibility,
privity alone. This is accomplished simply by making no provision
for admissibility.
Professor Morgan over the years has argued for this result with
great persuasiveness. There is, he has observed, no "magic" in privity;
he has referred, more than once, to this ground of admissibility as the
"ignis fatuus of privity"; 32 "there is no reason why a hearsay declaration of an available witness, which is self-serving or which has no
indicium of verity should be received against a party merely because
he happens to be in the relation of joint obligor, or joint owner, or
[successor] in interest with the declarant."33
And once we accept the "privity" principle we are led into all manner of questionable distinctions, wholly unrelated to trustworthiness.
In a death action where recovery is sought first, for the pain and
suffering endured by the deceased, and second, for his death under
Lord Campbell's Act, courts find privity between the deceased and
his representative in respect of the first claim but not in respect of
the second, with the result that declarations of the deceased touching
the circumstances of his injury will be receivable against his representative in the pain and suffering action but not in the action for
wrongful death, 34 although from the standpoint of trustworthiness
there can be no possible differentiation. And in actions on life insurance policies, admissibility, as against the beneficiary, of utterances
of the insured has been made to turn on whether the insured did, or
did not, in the policy, reserve the right to change the beneficiary. If
he did, there is privity; if he did not, there is no privity.35 The doctrine
results also in artificial distinctions in bankruptcy proceedings. "If a
bankrupt files a schedule with his voluntary petition, his statements
therein are made while he is owner; the title has not yet passed to his
trustee. If he becomes an involuntary bankrupt, his schedule is made
after the trustee acquires title. In the former situation, the schedule
is admissible against the trustee, in the latter, inadmissible." 36
Professor Morgan notes that in the English cases and, except for
"two or three stray instances," in the American cases, declarations
31. McCoR1ICK, EVIDENCE § 245 (1954).
32. Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARV. L. REV. 461,

480 (1929) ; Morgan, Admissions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 181, 203 (1937).
33. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508, comment (1942).

34. Eldridge v. Barton, 232 Mass. 183, 122 N.E. 272 (1919); McCoRMIcK,

EVIDENCE § 245 n. 9 (1954).
35. McCoRMicK, EVIDENCE § 245 n. 11 (1954).

36. Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARV. L. REV. 461,
478 (1929).
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of predecessors in interest held admissible were all actually against
interest when made.3 7 Thus, by rejecting privity alone as a ground
of admissibility, and referring the question of admissibility to the
exception for declarations against interest, this segment of the law
of hearsay would be put on a more rational basis and at the same time
would not, as a practical matter, greatly restrict admissibility. And
such is the solution proposed by the Uniform Rules. It is to be
observed again that unavailability of the declarant would not be
required by the Uniform Rule; "since [a declaration of fact against
interest] has as much trustworthiness as one made by the declarant
on the witness stand, there is no necessity for showing the declarant
to be unavailable as a witness."8
I think there is much to be said for this proposal, for the reasons
so often and so forcefully suggested by Professor Morgan. Yet I have
a lingering doubt. It is true that there is no "magic" in privity, so far
as trustworthiness is concerned. But is there any more "magic" in
the mere fact of agency, so far as the trustworthiness of agents'
declarations are concerned? An agent's declaration is receivable
against his principal, I assume, simply because of the relation between
them, not because, in virtue of that relation, the agent's declaration
possesses any more trustworthiness than other hearsay. And if
this be true, is it irrational to admit against a successor his predecessor's declaration because of the relation (privity) between them?
In other words, what gives to "agency" any more significance than
"privity"? If privity as a ground of admissibility is an ignis fatuus,
is not the fact of representation alone, as a ground of admissibility,
similarly a misleading notion? I suggest, therefore, that it is possible
that the argument for rejecting privity as a basis for admissibility
proves too much, for as Professor Morgan has said, "it would be
captious to refuse to apply to narrative utterances the ordinary principles of representation of the law of agency."3 9
37. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508, comment (1942).
38. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rule 509, comment (1942).

39. Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARv. L. REv. 461,
463 (1929).

